

World Economics Association Newsletter

To *plurality*. The Association will encourage the free exploration of economic reality from any perspective that adds to the sum of our understanding. To this end it advocates plurality of thought, method and philosophy.

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Heterodox economics or political economy? By [Frank Stilwell](#)

Seven years after the onset of the global financial crisis, when it was widely said that orthodox economic thinking had failed and should change, it is evident that any such changes have been far from decisive. Some would say it looks pretty much like business as usual. This is not just the case in the academy, where the core courses in university economics departments continue to emphasise basic training (some would say indoctrination) in neoclassical economic principles. It is also evident in the realm of economic policy which continues to be dominated by a neoliberal agenda, augmented by the post-crash politics of austerity.



The need for a pluralist perspective, both in economics education and in economic policy formulation, has become a widely accepted view among critics of orthodoxy. Because the monist character of orthodoxy is the problem, pluralism is the solution. This case has been extensively elaborated in the last two decades, including in my own writing. As John King argues, 'economics is unique among the social sciences in having a single monolithic mainstream, which is either unaware of or actively hostile to alternative approaches' (King 2013: 17). This has had deeply unfortunate educational consequences, limiting the understanding of

This resilience of mainstream economics makes it essential for dissenters to continually reconsider how best to challenge orthodoxy both in theory and practice.

Active participants in the WEA recognise the inadequacies of mainstream economics and the need for progressive alternatives in economics education, public debate and policy formulation. But how is progress to be achieved? A major lesson from the experience of struggles to establish alternative teaching and research programs is that doing so within territory occupied by orthodox economists is extraordinarily difficult. Intervening in broader public discourse is also a big challenge, given the entrenched interests and institutions that continue to shape its direction. Profound questions need to be considered for future strategy.

In this context, labels matter, as they do in marketing. They construct imagery and signal strategic choices. The two particular labels with which this article is concerned are 'heterodox economics' and 'political economy'. Is the ongoing challenge to mainstream economics better mounted under the former or latter rubric? Are the two terms synonymous? Is it just a matter of terminology? Or does the question touch on a bigger strategic choice – between seeking space for research and teaching of non-neoclassical economics **or** seeking to promote political economy as part of a broader interdisciplinary social and political project? Dissident groups commonly confront the questions of focus and self-identification and much may hinge on it. While the terminology itself is not crucial, it has implications for strategy.

In making the case for political economy, this article briefly explores five interrelated considerations, relating to issues of pluralism, politics, professional status, academic partnerships and public recognition.

Identifying as Pluralist

political economic processes and events. It marginalizes consideration of economic history and the history of economic thought, producing an ahistorical approach that creates a sort of professional amnesia. Worse still, social harm results, such as the dysfunctional policies enacted in the name of 'sound economics' since the onset of the global financial crisis. Concurrently, the official university research evaluation processes marginalise non-mainstream approaches, thereby operating to compound the above problems. This is a process of circular and cumulative causation, whereby monism in the mainstream excludes the very elements that could lead to better explanations of real-world economic phenomena. It is a vicious cycle. Only the widespread embrace of pluralism can correct it.

Such observations may be taken as supporting the case for challenging mainstream economics under the banner of 'heterodox economics'. On this reasoning, self-identifying as heterodox economists signals our concern that non-mainstream views should get a better hearing as alternative analyses of how the world actually works. In practice, it means confronting the dominant mainstream neoclassical economics with critical alternatives, including various strands of post-Keynesian economics, Marxist economics, institutional economics and analyses from feminist, ecological and various other perspectives. Indeed, this is what heterodox economists do. Moreover, a 'heterodox economics' label fits well with claims about pursuing academic practices that are conducive to an 'open society' in which freedom of expression exists and innovation and creativity flourish. It is also an antidote to right wing politicians' claims that 'there is no alternative'.

However, more careful consideration reveals that conflating the case for pluralism with the advocacy of heter-

odox economics raises three tricky problems.

First, heterodoxy and pluralism are not synonymous. Pluralism is a methodological position that embraces diversity as a matter of principle: it would normally include both the mainstream and a broad range of other viewpoints. Heterodoxy, on the other hand, usually entails opposition to orthodoxy: individual heterodox economists may also be hostile to approaches other than their preferred alternative. In struggles for progress in economics, heterodoxy and pluralism may seem to be close relatives, but it is pertinent to identify this conceptual difference. Pluralism is an 'in principle' position, based on ontological, epistemological and ethical propositions (as discussed by Mariyani-Squire and Moussa 2013), whereas the movement for heterodox economics is, more pragmatically, about creating space for preferred alternatives to the orthodoxy.

Second, there is the question of which alternatives should get that hearing. What is to be included in 'heterodox economics'? There seems to be reasonable consensus about the presence of contributions from Marxism, post-Keynesianism and institutional economics. Embracing ecological economics and feminist economics is also widely advocated, although neoclassical economists also assert their presence in these territories. But what about Austrian economics, with its right-wing libertarian 'free market' implications: should it also be included? And what of contributions in the distinctive traditions of Karl Polanyi or Henry George: shouldn't they also be in the mix? A 'heterodox economics' that simply accommodates all these elements may be quite eclectic, potentially dissipating or even blunting the challenge to the neoclassical paradigm. Some stronger conception of 'unity in diversity' may be necessary for progress.

The third difficulty is that some economists claim that the mainstream has itself already become heterodox. Diana Coyle (2007) and David Colander (2009) are among those who have propounded this view. They posit that the embrace of game theory, new growth theory, behavioural and experimental economics, complexity economics and other theoretical innovations have reduced the dominance of neoclassicism (Thornton 2015). Personally, I find the argument unconvincing for at least three reasons. First, while these analytical developments give the appearance of some diversity within the mainstream, the underlying assumptions of methodological individualism and systemic stability through market forces remain pervasive. Indeed, invoking the novelty of pluralism within neoclassical economics as a response to the deficiencies of the discipline ignores the diversity that has characterised the discipline since its inception, without this ever entailing a paradigm shift in, or a radi-

cal break from, these underlying presumptions. Second, these elements of product differentiation have not generally displaced neoclassical economics from the core curriculum that is taught to students, although they often form the basis for electives in later years of study. Because what is taught in the foundation years determines the basis on which the discipline and profession is defined and reproduced, the changes are neither fundamental nor transformative. Third, if an academic profession is to be judged ultimately by its external influences and effects, it is evident that it is still largely 'business as usual' for an orthodox economics that functions as capitalist ideology. The close association between neoclassicism in the academy and neoliberalism in the realm of public policy remains much in evidence. Even Diane Coyle, notable for her previous emphasis on the flexibility of the economics discipline, has conceded that the catastrophic impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-08 has had little impact on how the academic orthodoxy in economics is constructed and reproduced (Coyle 2013). Nevertheless, the assertion of an 'internal heterodoxy' within mainstream economics unfortunately muddies the waters. Maybe that is its purpose.

These considerations illustrate the importance of pluralism in challenging the orthodoxy, but also indicate some of the associated tensions. Seeking more unity, analytically and organizationally, would be helpful in a conflict situation like this. This entails working together to extend and broaden the critique of mainstream economics and challenging its influences, both on students and in the wider worlds of economic discourse and public policy. Concurrently, seeking common elements, even partial syntheses, of the principal progressive, non-neoclassical currents of analysis is important in developing effective and influential alternatives. The following considerations indicate why the embrace of a broader 'political economy' can contribute to this more assertive strategy for challenging the mainstream.

Being Explicitly Political

Self-identifying as a movement for 'political economy' points to the inherently political character of the undertaking, explicitly challenging mainstream economists' claim to be pursuing 'value-free' lines of inquiry. Talking of political economy necessarily raises questions about 'what politics?' and 'whose values?' It also signals the quest for finding commonalities among the currents of thought that are critical of the mainstream. This shared ground may be *ontological*, as Tony Lawson has recurrently emphasised in making the case for a critical realist approach (Lawson 2006, Morgan 2016). Thus, the unity may come from a 'world view' of the capitalist economy structured by power relations and prone to inequality and crises. The common ground may also be *methodo-*

logical, emphasising a shared commitment to analysis of the historically-contingent character of economic phenomena rather than 'equilibrium' conditions. The common ground may also be explicitly *political*, emphasising the mission of putting democratic politics in command *vis-a-vis* market forces, as posited by Higgins and Dow (2105). It may be, and probably should be, all three.

Conventional claims and protestations to the contrary, mainstream economics is inherently value-laden and political. So too is challenging and changing it. Signalling this in the labelling of the challenge is a healthy antidote to spurious claims about economics being a value-free science. As Gunnar Myrdal (1953) strongly emphasised, the development of economic thought has always and everywhere had a political character. In the real world economics and politics are intertwined. Therefore, successfully challenging the dominant orthodoxy cannot be just a matter of developing 'better' economic models (claiming higher values for explanatory capacity). It also has to be a political process.

Asserting Professional Status

Another advantage of the term 'political economy' is its long and respectable lineage. Indeed, political economy has a strong claim to actually **be** the mainstream, running from the eighteenth through to the twenty-first century and including seminal contributions from Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Kalecki, Robinson, Myrdal, Galbraith, Heilbroner and modern contributors to that broad tradition of social inquiry. From this perspective, neoclassical economics may be regarded as an initially interesting side-track that became a *cul-de-sac* (albeit one with a massive volume of traffic).

This claim about the status and centrality of political economy is contested by modern mainstream economists, of course. If the term political economy is mentioned at all, it is usually treated as being of purely historical interest, relating to the characteristics of economic inquiry in a pre-scientific era. Or it may be taken as referring only to the analysis and prescription of public policy. That use of the term by practitioners associated with the Virginia School, the Chicago School and contemporary 'public choice' theory is a common source of confusion in the USA, in particular. In historical usage, political economy has also been the label given to concerns with policies that may modify or regulate the economy's functioning in pursuit of specified social objectives, contrasting with economics as the study of how the economy works. These are terminological difficulties that unfortunately muddy the waters, once again. However, trying to avoid these issues by retreating to 'heterodox economics' seems to accept marginal disciplinary status as all that is ever likely to be on offer. This is indicated by the usual inclusion (at best!) of 'heterodox economics' in

a residual 'other economics' category in official research publication classifications. Challenging this marginalisation, and defining a positive agenda for alternative economic analysis rather than merely reacting to the mainstream, is a substantial long-term concern that requires redefining the relevant territory – in effect, challenging the nature and limits of the discipline.

Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships

Even if the economics profession continues to deflect the challenges posed by heterodox economists, substantial progress can be made in relation to cognate social sciences. This is a necessary element in a strategy for progress because mainstream economists working in universities usually resist attempts to reconstitute their discipline on genuinely pluralist principles. Marxist political economy, for example, can usually only get a hearing as an historically discredited view; while 'old' institutionalism, if mentioned at all, is merely a precursor to 'new institutional economics', which is more compatible with a neoclassical approach. Heterodox economists may get jobs in economics departments: some do, especially if their 'deviance' develops after secure employment has been achieved, but they are often not replaced by people of similar inclination when they retire or move on.

Establishing more secure territory for teaching and research in political economy can be easier in other areas within the social sciences where there is concern to deal with the economic dimensions of social problems and public policy. In my experience, political economists are usually welcomed into the latter territories (if they eschew the imperialist ambitions that have been evident when neoclassical economists seek to invade other territories in the social sciences). Thus, it is the mutual-learning relationship of political economy with subjects like sociology, geography, politics or history that is crucial. Interestingly, it is the commitment to interdisciplinary studies, rather than the commitment to pluralism in economics, that is more important in building these partnerships.

In other words, establishing a foothold for political economy, whether as a university department separate from economics (as in the University of Sydney's Department of Political Economy where I taught for over four decades) or in conjunction with other social science disciplines, is a precondition for heterodox economics having a sustainable place in university education and research. Having established any such foothold, good teaching can show that political economy has the potential to provide a richer learning experience than straight mainstream economics (O'Donnell 2014). Similarly, research and policy advocacy can usually get a good hearing where political economists contribute to interdisciplinary studies on matters of public significance and con-

cern.

Achieving Public Recognition

The challenge to orthodox economics will always be marginal if it remains a purely academic concern. Beyond the universities are important avenues for public influence. Education within the labour movement is one such focus (Stanford 2015). Political economic writing for popular magazines and websites is also important, as is participation in the media and working with political parties and progressive NGOs. Preparing submissions to government inquiries – and concurrently using that material in academic and/or journalistic contributions – are activities that fit well into this strategy. Being in tune with the concerns of, and having an identity that is recognized by, a broader public is crucial for challenging the influence of mainstream economics.

In this last respect, the term ‘political economy’ clearly has the edge over ‘heterodox economics’. Political economy signals a broad conception of how we understand the economy in a historical, social and political context. It has substantially greater potential for public recognition, being a label that is reasonably intelligible to non-specialists. It contrasts, in this respect, with the typically bemused response of members of the general public when hearing the term ‘heterodox economics’ – ‘huh, what’s that?’.

Conclusion

Challenging mainstream economics does not produce a simple or straightforward clash, like that between two sporting teams seeking to score more runs or goals to determine the winner. The rules of the contest are not agreed beforehand and there is no agreed venue, nor impartial umpire. Even the criteria by which success is judged are contestable.

For dissident economists to label themselves as heterodox is academically respectable but may be strategically weak. On the positive side, the big plus of heterodoxy is its apparent association with pluralism, indicating aversion to dogma and openness to alternative ways of seeing. However, there is a tension between pluralism and heterodox economics, as I have argued in this article. The strategic problem is that arguing for heterodox economics presumes the centrality of an orthodoxy: almost by definition, therefore, it is consigned to the outer. This tends to put advocates of heterodox economics ‘on the back foot’, seeking shelter for an array of different views whatever their coherence or relationship to each other. Pushing for political economy to have a central place in economic discourse is a more assertive strategy. It is compatible with the embrace of pluralism, but more emphasis is placed on unity in diversity, the political elements that infuse the competing currents of economic thought, the potential for gaining strength

through interdisciplinary partnerships and the need for broader public recognition and influence.

I do not present these views in the expectation that individuals and associations will abandon their current self-identification as ‘heterodox economists’. That is not the principal point of this article. Rather, it is to locate heterodox economics as part of a broader political economy project that is concerned with understanding how economies function in relation to social processes and developing political practices that can contribute to more equitable and sustainable arrangements for the future. This is an inherently interdisciplinary and explicitly political project. It matters because it opposes a misleading and class-biased economic orthodoxy and because of its critique of ‘actually existing capitalism’ and neoliberal policy practices in society at large. This political economy project cannot properly be an exclusively academic concern, partly because of the internal constraints within academia but, more positively, because there is considerable thirst for it in the broader society. Indeed, whether under the rubric of heterodox economics or political economy, there is much work to be done.

Note: This short article has been developed from a paper presented by the author to the conference of the Society for Heterodox Economics (SHE) held in December 2015 in Sydney, Australia, and the editorial written for the special issue of *The Journal of Australian Political Economy* on the theme of ‘heterodox economics’. I thank participants at the conference and colleagues who provided constructive feedback on an earlier draft of this article.

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On Jean Tirole's letter to the French Higher Education Minister By [Peter Swann](#)

The Debate about Professor Jean Tirole's Letter to the French Higher Education Minister

Over the last year, there has been an online debate about a letter written by Professor Jean Tirole, the Nobel Laureate of 2014, to the French Minister for Higher Education. Some readers will be well aware of this already, but some may not, as most of the debate has been in French.

The magazine *Marianne* first published the letter, in French, [here](#). The Association Française d'Economie Politique published a translation, in English, [here](#). In his letter, Tirole makes some critical and uncompromising remarks about heterodox economists and their work. This following passage captures the essence of his argument:

"Breaking up the community of French economists by creating a refuge for a disparate group, in trouble with the assessment standards that are internationally acknowledged, is a very bad answer to the failure of this group in its effort to have its works validated by the great scientific journals, that prevail in our discipline."

Tirole seems to be saying that heterodox economists are unworthy of membership of the economics discipline, but at the same time, they should not be allowed to apply for refuge elsewhere. To put it as mildly as possible, that is a pretty uncompromising position.

The letter provoked a lively debate in French, in the magazine *Marianne*, [here](#) and [here](#), and in the French press more generally: [here](#), for example, in *Liberation*.

Turning to the debate in English, the Association Fran-

çaise d'Economie Politique published an open letter to Jean Tirole, [here](#). As a specialist in innovation, I strongly agree with their argument that some of the most important innovations originate from the margins of a discipline, or the margins of an industry, and not from the core. The following, *inter alia*, have also made responses: [Jones](#), [Vass and Pocklington](#), [Vernengo](#), and [Tinel](#). For the most part, these authors do not support Tirole's views.

One prominent author, however, does support *some* of Tirole's views, at least. In an article for the *Financial Times*, [here](#), John Kay writes:

"... no one would cross a bridge built by a heterodox engineer."

Personally, I would be just as anxious about crossing a bridge built by *entirely orthodox* engineers, if I knew that they were reluctant to review their theory of bridge design in the light of recent (and historic) examples of bridge collapse. However, I am informed that a module on, 'learning from disasters', is a routine part of degree courses in civil engineering.

Unfortunately, however, it is still not routine for degree courses in economics to include a module in 'learning from disasters'. A common reason for that is that many orthodox economists are, frankly, reluctant to review – and still less to modify or abandon – their cherished economic theories in the light of contradictory evidence from economic disasters.

Readers of the WEA Newsletter will surely have valuable contributions to make to this debate.

Beyond the Legacies of Prof. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Reflecting on the Formation of Global Developmental Agenda

By [Karim Errouaki](#)¹

Prof. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary-General (UNSG), passed away at the age of 93 in a Cairo hospital on Tuesday February 16th, 2016. Egypt's President Mr. Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi led the funeral procession for the country's veteran diplomat as he was laid to rest with full State honours. He was a champion of peace for Egypt and for the world a symbol, as the first Arab and African to occupy the position of UNSG. The incumbent UNSG, Ban Ki Moon, in his tribute, stated that "the UN Community will mourn a memorable leader who rendered invaluable services to ensure world peace and international order".

A tribute to an uncommon gem, a gallant diplomat and a world-acclaimed great leader of rare intellectual prowess

To me, it is a great privilege to write this tribute in the memory and in honour of Prof. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a scholar, diplomat, visionary leader and determined man of impeccable principles and international repute. He was my mentor, friend and colleague. I have known Mr. Boutros-Ghali since the early 1980s. I admired him all his life and will continue to admire him. Our friendship, which was further reinforced, culminated in my collaborating with him as his Special Adviser during his tenure as UNSG, a position I held even thereafter as I continued to serve in this capacity when in 1998 he was elected first Secretary-General of the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF) Paris and later on when he was appointed in 2003 the first President of the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights. It is a privilege to be counted among his friends.

When in 1996 he relinquished his duties as UNSG, the former Director General of UNESCO, Prof. Dr. Federico Mayor Zaragoza, published a magnificent celebratory two-volume book (*Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber*, Bruylant, Brussels, 1998) in his honour that focused on the triad which inspired many of his actions, summarized in his well-known Agenda, namely, Peace, Development and Democracy. Federico Mayor Zaragoza and many of Boutros-Ghali's friends such as Karel Vasak, Jacques Delors, Michel Camdessus, James Wolfensohn, Yevgeny Primakov, Prince El Hassan Bin Talal, George Soros, Robert Badinter, Maurice Druon, Enrique Iglesias to name just few, thought that a special tribute should be paid to him, recognizing that, when in the service of the international community, he never ceased to be an eminent intellectual, open to all the cul-

tures of the World.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was very accessible and had a wonderful sense of humour which overflowed from an inner calm. The years have not dimmed his intellect nor have they detracted from his wry sense of humour. Self-deprecating at times, his humour projected his self-confidence as well as his "joie de vivre". His talents as a great communicator earned him unflinching respect amongst generations of Egyptians, Arab intellectuals and prominent scholars and politicians whether they agreed with him or not. All this served him well at the apex of his career, when he was elected UNSG in 1992. It is in his capacity as UNSG that history, as well as peers, will judge Mr. Boutros-Ghali.

In the course of working with him, I quickly noticed his sound intellectual and political wealth, as well as his firm, dogged and undaunted commitment to the democratization of international relations. He proved that he was capable not only of thinking in the abstract, but also of acting pragmatically, received the sort of education, and inherited the distinctive ancestral merits, that paved



the way for the great heights he attained in his own right. Our intellectual and geopolitical interests were in part close. I can affirm that we were also linked by the same way of considering the responsibility of intellectuals towards society, and by the need to connect scientific explanations to the consequences for action; that was not for an ideological apriorism nor for an urgency of operation, but for the firm belief in the validity of scientific anal-

yses and their social mandate at the service of human freedom.

When he was elected UNSG it was evident that the world was in need of a new direction. Moreover, his election coincided with the mandates of his two close friends, namely, Mr. Federico Mayor Zaragoza (D-G of UNESCO) and Mr. Michel Camdessus (MD of IMF). UNESCO was the conscience of the UN.² He, therefore, found at UNESCO and the IMF and later on at the World Bank and WTO partners for Peace, Development and Democracy. Boutros-Ghali, Federico Mayor Zaragoza, Michel Camdessus, James Wolfensohn and Renato Ruggero were linked in a partnership to work on some of the most important commitments of the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN. It was, then, no surprise that UNESCO, IMF, World Bank, WTO and the UN had much in common in the tumultuous decade of the 1990s on such issues as the indebtedness of the least developed

countries, assistance to countries in post-conflict situations, the need for concessional financing for developing countries, the importance of good governance, the promotion of the culture of peace, and the risks and challenges of globalization.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali knew that any effort to transform the UN should be gradual and should be based on its undeniable successes and should be accompanied by measures to meet the challenges of the world context. He was a cosmopolitan figure with a deep sense of commitment to objectivity and precision. His convictions were strongly conveyed, a fact that rendered the UN threatening to those who did not have their way in dictating policy and led them to recoil into brooding and vengeful rhetoric. In a way, this explains the last episode of his tenure.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali faced the challenges of adapting the UN to the revolutionary changes which had taken place in world politics since the end of the Cold War. He recognized more quickly than many others that the end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities for the Organization. For more than four decades the Security Council in particular had been paralyzed by the East-West conflict. The end of the East-West conflict gave the UN the opportunity to finally play its role as a global organization which sought to bring about and preserve world peace. The bipolar relationship between Moscow and Washington had given way to a multipolar world in which all areas of life are experiencing the effects of globalization.

A Triple Agenda but One Global Vision

It was against this background that Mr. Boutros-Ghali, as the UNSG, commissioned three Agenda, namely studies of Peace, Democracy and Development, in the hopes of initiating not only discussions but also movements to shape new policies. The problems of peace, democracy, and development were interdependent, and the policies that would promote each would generally also create favourable conditions for the others.

In his speech at the Japan Institute of International Relations in December 1999, Mr. Boutros-Ghali spoke about the connection between Peace, Democracy and Development in the post-Cold War era. He observed:

"All three (Agenda) are interlocked and I will try to explain what this means with reference to the three Agenda I presented during my mandate as the Secretary-General of the United Nations: Agenda for Peace in 1992, Agenda for Development in 1994 and Agenda for Democratization in 1996. Peacekeeping, development and democracy are being redefined and extended in the post-Cold War era. The connections between them are beginning to emerge. We will need a new level of understanding, and a new depth of commitment to understand the importance of this connection if we want to make human security a reality."³

To understand the complexity of the articulation be-

tween peace, development and democracy⁴ he formulated four basic rules, to wit:

1. The potential recurrence of conflict is a constant threat to the peace process and to human security. Hence any external support for post-conflict peace building, post-conflict development and post-conflict democracy-building must be consistent and sustained.
2. International assistance must be phased over time, focusing on development before the conflict, on humanitarian aid during the conflict, rehabilitation after the conflict, and sustainable development aid in order to build peace and promote human security.
3. There is no one model of democratization or democracy suitable to all societies. Democracy cannot be exported or imported. Each State must be free to decide for itself its priorities for the welfare of its people.
4. Democratization within States must also be supported by a process of democratization among States. The globalization of the market economy must be controlled by a global democracy.

Clearly the three Agenda are interrelated: peace is in many ways a crucial precondition for both democracy and development. War is not only destructive - funding the military and ammunition also absorbs scarce resources that could otherwise be more gainfully deployed for development. Moreover, war either leads to chaos, civil unrest and loss of human resources, or results in military rule which relegates democracy to the background. On the other hand, peace will be easier to achieve and sustained if development is under way and democratic institutions are in place. And, in turn, democracy will be more readily attainable if development is occurring. While this will usually generate winners and losers, democracy offers a political forum in which losers can press their case for protection and compensation. In addition, popular pressure will usually prevent the winners from scooping up every jackpot in sight. In other words, a democratic system is likely to alleviate the social pains and reduce the conflicts that may hinder development. Interdependence cuts two ways.

If the three Agenda rest on and support each other, by the same token, that means that in the absence of peace, it will be harder to get development under way, while the absence of development will make peace harder to achieve, and the absence of democracy can be expected to pose problems for both development and peace. How to begin, when, as in many parts of the world, all three are clearly absent, so that we are faced with war and poverty under dictatorial rule? Where should we start? Such questions surely cannot be answered in general, and often cannot be answered with any certainty, even in particular cases.

During the 51st Anniversary celebration of the United

Nations in Rome, Prof. Boutros-Ghali observed that “those active in international life are guarantors of democracy and play a fundamental role in today’s world”. He has been a tireless crusader on the impact of globalization on the economic and social progress of both countries and peoples. He argued at many occasions that “the global economy poses many threats, including that of destroying traditional bonds of solidarity, marginalizing countries, and further widening the gap between rich and poor”.⁵

Boutros Ghali (2003)⁶ argued that globalization could only realize its potential benefits if it was circumscribed and regulated democratically. The impact of globalization is far-reaching and powerful, for good and bad. For example, the effects of reducing trade and investment barriers extend far beyond the markets immediately involved, and many of these effects may be destructive and long-lasting. Those affected must be allowed some say in how the process is managed, how damage is to be prevented, and how those damaged are to be compensated. That is the point of democracy and justice, and it requires the construction of appropriate institutions. The famous slogan of the American Revolution was ‘No taxation without representation’. Boutros-Ghali’s proposals called for voice and representation for those affected by globalization. His proposals, in effect, amounted to bringing that slogan up to date, so that it now becomes: ‘No globalization without representation.’

Markets and democracy were utopian dreams in the late 19th Century, barely realized in only a few advanced countries. Now they are reality. Similarly he was proposing - peace and regulated transformational growth for human development, supporting worldwide full employment - may seem utopian today. But these proposals will work, and could achieve the goal of making globalization work for human development. One day this vision, too, could be reality, however utopian it may seem now. But before it can become reality, it has to be set out and debated; it has to become part of the discourse.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali: A Diplomat for Development

Nell, Errouaki and Mayor (‘Reinventing Globalization after the Crash’, 2016)⁷ observed that the principles that animated the career of Mr. Boutros-Ghali during his tenure as UNSG were developed in the triple Agenda. Each of these was a program to make the world a better place; each laid out a masterly survey of the problems in its area, followed by a comprehensive analysis of relevant policies, and ended with specific proposals. Mr. Boutros-Ghali honoured us by writing the Preface to our book (‘Reinventing Globalization after the Crash’, 2016) which was the last piece he ever wrote. He rightly noted in the preface that:

“globalization was widely considered a new development; but it was not. It not only happened before, tak-

ing place on a grand scale prior to World War I, but it had, in fact, always been a feature of capitalist development, even if not appearing in such a dramatic guise.”

Like Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, Boutros-Ghali raised concerns over fairness – globalization meant reaching out and bringing new economies or areas of economy into the world system, but in the process it *excludes* as well as includes. Those excluded may well be worse off than ever. And those included may be included on terms that violate our sense of fairness, yet the institutions that will provide ways of remedying global unfairness still have to be built. We provided in our book ways of assessing these problems. Like Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, Boutros-Ghali noted that opponents of Globalization contended that the economic pressures it created may undermine the idea of ‘capitalism with a human face’. The growth generated by globalization can actually create or intensify poverty in some areas – it can become ‘immiserizing growth’⁸ and trade can generate pressures that increase inequality. But that, we argued in our book, is because we have not directly addressed the issue of *humanizing* globalization itself.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was responsible for crafting a new international development agenda, with enormous global support. As former President of the World Bank James Wolfenshon put it:

“Boutros’s commitment to peace and development took him to every corner of the globe. He used these two pillars to establish his two-track diplomacy with countries everywhere. He deserves a great deal of credit for his forward-looking efforts on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and land-mines, a cause that has now been successfully taken up across the globe... He also gave a strong push for democratization and democracy in the world.”⁹

Furthermore, former Managing Director of IMF Michel Camdessus noted that:

“Boutros-Ghali, from his perspective, was adamant that development should be recognized as the foremost task of our time and identified peace, the economy, environmental protection, social justice, and democracy as the five dimensions of development. He underscored that development requires competent government leadership, coherent national policies, and strong popular commitment.”¹⁰

Mr. Boutros-Ghali has long observed that development is not just economic growth, although that is central. He argued that social factors, like literacy, education and public health, are as much a part of development as purely market matters. They affect economic growth and are affected by it. Health and education, for example, are central to the productivity of the labour force, but they cannot be provided adequately unless the

economy is itself in good shape. Environmental factors are likewise central; public health cannot be maintained without clean air and water, agriculture can fail if the desert spreads because of improper cultivation or deforestation. Both social and environmental factors interact not only with economics, but also with the pressures determining the rate at which the population will grow. This, in turn, will affect the level of prosperity.¹¹

Nell, Errouaki and Mayor (2016) argued that development is not only a complex of interactions between economic, social and environmental variables. It also causes social upheavals, as traditional ways of life are uprooted and replaced by new. Joseph Schumpeter's term was "Creative Destruction," meaning that development rested in large part on innovation, and that innovation not only brings about new products and new technologies but in the process destroys the old. And as the old products and technologies slip into oblivion, so, too, do the corresponding skills and traditions. Whole ways of life can disappear under the pressure of the forces of development, while new ones are being formed. This is all now happening with unprecedented speed.

We tend to assume that the creativity will outweigh the destructiveness, but this is not assured. First, the market only records profit and loss as experienced in monetary terms, but even this is not so clear. Are these monetary flows to be measured in the long run or in the short run? In the short run it may be hard to tell which prevails, for when markets are driving large changes there is usually confusion, if not chaos. On the other hand, as Keynes famously said: in the long run we are all dead. Second, many of the gains and losses will lie outside of the market. That is, the activities in question will impose losses and gains on people who are not directly involved in the transactions, e.g., losses to those who live downwind of a polluting factory, or gains to those who find their property values rising because of crowding in other parts of the city. There is surely a need, as Boutros-Ghali has argued, to give a voice to those who bear the burden of the destruction. Otherwise, if no opposition can raise its voice, if there are no ways to set limits on the market, the destruction may get out of hand, and could eventually bring social conflict.

Development rests on innovation, which not only raises productivity and reduces costs, but perhaps more importantly changes the character of jobs, and even social life itself. Labour is forced out of agriculture, always and everywhere, with important and often catastrophic consequences for the economy of the countryside. This is the process that brings about 'creative destruction'. Globalization drives this process; it encourages, and very often, forces rural to urban migration with all its attendant dislocation and disruption of lifestyles. Unchecked, this can lead to social turmoil and economic disaster – even if the patterns of trade and investment

that engendered the changes were economically sound. The disruptive changes may be extreme enough to undermine the initial economic advances. In such a case the globalization would not be sustainable – which might be considered reason enough to develop policies to channel and direct the process.

Nell, Errouaki and Mayor (2016) argued that for too long conventional economics has insisted that it can examine the problems of the economy and reach sound conclusions separately from any consideration of the social and political context in which economic issues are embedded. It does so by assuming that the populations of countries undergoing development are made up of well-informed 'rational agents' who make precise choices in response to well-defined economic signals, and thereby maximize their welfare. This is simply not how the world works. The evident fact is that, in the course of development, social and political forces impact strongly and frequently on economic matters, very often in unpredictable ways. And economic changes have social and political consequences. Indeed, it is often difficult to separate the economic from the social and political.

Conclusion

Mr. Boutros-Ghali decided to pay more attention to Africa - a continent that had practically been erased from the world's agenda, and considered by many governments and leaders in the past to suffer from a terminal disease as though fate had destined it to be stricken by poverty, sickness, discrimination and war. I think that what brought Mr. Boutros Ghali to Africa was a sense of justice, not expediency. He trod the unpaved paths of that land, and spent several man-hours striving to prevent it from being erased from the map of global attention.

Former President of the World Bank James Wolfenshon rightly noted that:

"Boutros Boutros-Ghali left no doubt about his passionate commitment to putting the forces of the UN behind African economic development, which included political and civil security. He was unwavering in his support to countries that were in most need of development finance. At the same time he encouraged the World Bank to work closely with UN programs in such areas as health, education, agriculture and infrastructure, seeking the best use of resources in achieving development goals in the region."¹²

It was not possible to implement all the reforms envisaged by Mr. Boutros-Ghali. However, to blame him for this, as many are wont to do, is, to say the least, unjust. One merely has to look at the handicaps of a UNSG to understand this. The UN, like every organization, cannot do more than its members wish and allow. This applies in particular to the permanent members of the UN Security Council. They have a special responsibility for the future development of the UN. It is therefore all the more re-

grettable that they have hitherto lacked the necessary will to reform and reorganize the UN and that they did not give the reform plans of SG Mr. Boutros-Ghali the necessary support which would have enabled them to see the light of the day.

The refinement of Mr. Boutros-Ghali did not prevent him from entering the arena, with the realization that in order to attain justice, it is necessary to defy conventional concepts. Statesmen have to look back on their past achievements and ask themselves not only how many assets they accumulated along the way, but also how many noble values they served. From this perspective, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was an uncommon intellectual pillar, an enlightened statesman, wise advocate of sustainable development and a valiant proponent of human liberation.

His career did not do justice to his brilliant intellect, his outstanding academic achievements, his devotion to the rule of international law, and his universal contribution to the enhancement of the levels of multinational discourse. He also laid the foundation for managerial reform, restructuring and reorganization that we are now seeing develop under the incumbent Secretary-General.

He has run his race and won his laurels. There is time to be born and time to die. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, to forget a man who impacted so much on the international community.

Although Mr. Boutros-Ghali showed me a lot of things, and from him I learned a lot that I didn't hitherto know, yet he forgot to teach me one last thing i.e. how to let him go! If God could grant me one last wish I'd ask to say "Goodbye"! We've lost a rare gem, another champion of peace and liberty. We will all miss him.

Notes

1. Karim Errouaki holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the New School for Social Research (New York). He has taught and lectured in many parts of the world, including New York, Washington, Boston, Montreal, Sherbrook, Vancouver, London, Brussels, Paris, Madrid, Mexico, and Sao Paolo, among others. He is coauthor with Edward J. Nell of *Rational Econometric Man* (London, Elgar, 2013), with Edward J. Nell and Federico Mayor Zaragoza of *Reinventing Globalization after the Crash* (2016). He is a former Special Advisor to UNSG Prof. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and to Director General of UNESCO Prof. Dr. Federico Mayor Zaragoza. He is currently Ambassador of the International Organization of Latin-American Mayors in Morocco for Africa, Special Advisor to the Chairman of ECO Capacity Exchange, a leading Trade and Finance global organisation based in London, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for the Culture of Peace (Autonomous University of Madrid), and a Special Advisor to the Director General of CAFRAD, Pan-African Intergovernmental Organization.
2. During his twelve years as Director General of UNESCO (1987-1999) Federico Mayor Zaragoza gave new life to the organization's mission to build a "bastion of peace in the minds of all people," putting the institution at the service of peace, tolerance, human rights, and

peaceful coexistence, working within the scope of its powers and remaining faithful to its original goals. Under Mayor Zaragoza's guidance UNESCO created the "Culture of Peace Programme," whose objectives revolve around four main themes: education for peace; human rights and democracy; the fight against isolation and poverty; the defence of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; and conflict prevention and the consolidation of peace.

3. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali at <http://www2.jiia.or.jp/report/conference/anniversary/e-ghali.html>.
4. Let's recall here the excellent work done by James Galbraith and his associates at the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). This is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit research organization dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress. The IEP is an UN-accredited NGO in Special Consultative Status to the UN Economic and Social Council. IEP is well known internationally for the Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI ranks 162 nations according to states of peacefulness. It also has raised significant awareness about the drivers and indicators of peace and has become a valued resource used by major organizations and governments around the world.
5. Speech at the celebration of the UN Fifty-first Anniversary in Rome, January 11, 1996.
6. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali (2003), *Democratizar la Globalización*, Universidad del Valle, Artes Graficas del Valle Ltda, Cali.
7. The title of the book is '*Reinventing Globalization after the Crash*', Forthcoming in 2016. The book is based on material provided by Federico Mayor Zaragoza's book *The World Ahead*, revisited and animated by the theoretical framework put forward by Nell in his opus magnum book *General Theory of Transformational Growth* (Cambridge University Press, 1998) and extended by Karim Errouaki (UM, HEC-Montreal, 2003) who argued that Transformational Growth provides a new vision and a new framework, for thinking about economic development, bringing it into the framework of economic history.
8. 'Immiserizing growth' is a theoretical situation first proposed by Jagdish Bhagwati, in 1958, where economic growth could result in a country being worse off than before the growth. See Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1958. "Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note," *Review of Economic Studies* 25, (June), pp. 201-205.
9. See James Wolfelshon in Federico Mayor Zaragoza Federico Mayor Zaragoza (1998) *Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber*, Brussels: Bruylant, p.76
10. See Michel Camdessus in Federico Mayor Zaragoza Federico Mayor Zaragoza (1998) *Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber*, Brussels: Bruylant, p. 953.
11. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy commissioned two Nobel Laureates, namely, Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz, to help devise a more holistic indicator of economic progress than gross domestic product, which falls to account for issues like income inequality that have been at the heart of the globalization debate. Furthermore, Sen argued that economics is not just politics. There is more to human progress than aggregate statistics of growth. We have to ask the right questions and concentrate on what matters to people. See the International Herald Tribune of January 23, 2008.
12. See James Wolfelshon in Federico Mayor Zaragoza (1998) *Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber*, Brussels: Bruylant, p.76

The Five Stages of Economic Grief (Stage 3)

By [David Orrell](#)

David Orrell reviews Rodrik D (2015) *Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science*, New York: Norton.

In her 1969 book, *On Death and Dying*, the Swiss psychiatrist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross identified five separate stages or aspects of the grief process. These were denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.

The field of economics experienced a traumatic loss during the financial crisis, which left Alan Greenspan in what he called in 2008 testimony “a state of shocked disbelief.” Economists (at least those in the mainstream) are now working their way slowly through the grief progress, as they realise that their treasured economic models not only failed to predict the crisis, but played an active role in creating it.

I have written elsewhere about the first two stages, namely denial and anger. A 2014 article for *World Finance* magazine asked “Is economics in a state of denial?” (the answer was: yes), while 2015’s “Book burning economists” discussed the anger that some economists were venting on certain critics (e.g. me). The next stage – and the theme of this book review – is “bargaining”. Part of this is bargaining with the future – if we follow certain rules perhaps we can put things right – but another is a kind of retroactive bargaining with the past, saying that the event would not have occurred *if only* such-and-such had happened.

A case in point is *Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science*, by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University, which sets out to explain “why economics sometimes gets it right and sometimes doesn’t.” Rodrik’s conclusion is that mathematical models “are both economics’ strength and its Achilles’ heel.” On the one hand they offer a degree of clarity and consistency which is not possible with purely verbal descriptions. However they are easily misused or taken out of context.

Telling a story

As Rodrik points out, models are best seen as a kind of story. No single model can accurately capture every detail of the economy, but it can illuminate some aspect of the system. The trick is therefore to choose which model is the most suitable for any particular situation. (Or – better – we can use a mix of theories, while keeping in mind what Keynes referred to in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* as “the necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments which we



shall have to make later on.”) One conclusion is that very large and general models, of the sort often favoured by macroeconomists, are not very useful: “I cannot think of an important economic insight that has come out of such models. In fact, they have often led us astray.”

Rodrik also acknowledges that most economists missed the causes of the financial crisis, with some notable exceptions who were quickly shouted down (such as the

IMF’s Raghuram Rajan, who in 2005 told an audience of central bankers including Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke that financial innovation had introduced new risks into the financial system, only to be called a “Luddite” by Larry Summers).

According to Rodrik, the reason that the profession did not cover itself in glory before and during the crisis was that leading economists had bought into the dominant efficient market paradigm which saw markets “not only as inherently efficient and stable, but also as self-disciplining.” Regulators just had to get out of the way and the invisible hand would do its job. However, economists use all kinds of models in their work, and “what makes this episode particularly curious is that there were, in fact, plenty of models to help explain what had been going on under the economy’s hood.”

If only they had chosen the right model, perhaps something could have been done! Indeed one such model, which Rodrik does not mention, is that of Hyman Minsky, whose work on financial stability became famous after the crisis, but was all but unknown before it; an assessment published a year after his 1996 death concluded that his “work has not had a major influence in the macroeconomic discussions of the last thirty years.” Curious indeed.

Rodrik also seems a little surprised by claims, from student-based groups such as Manchester University’s Post Crash Economics Society, that economics is overly narrow and lacks pluralism. “How do we understand these complaints,” Rodrik asks, “in light of the patent multiplicity of models within economics?”

A possible reason might be that economists have what he notes is a “guild mentality” which “renders the profession insular and immune to outside criticism.” He observes in a couple of places that “Only card-carrying members of the profession are viewed as legitimate participants in economic debates.” But later he cites the influence of behavioural psychologists and so on to conclude that “the view of economics as an insular, inbred

discipline closed to outside influence is more caricature than reality."

His answer instead is that there is nothing wrong with economics per se, there is just a communication problem. Most economists are poor at presenting their arguments to the public, because they "see themselves as scientists and researchers whose job it is to write academic papers." Also undergraduate students at Manchester, or Rodrik's Harvard where students launched their own protest in 2011, obviously don't get exposed to the full rich diversity of economic thought. Though this still doesn't quite explain why, as Cambridge University economists Ha-Joon Chang and Jonathan Aldred wrote in 2014, their subject "is the only academic discipline in which a significant and increasing number of students are in an open revolt against the content of their degree courses."

Good grief

Rodrik concludes his book with "Ten Commandments" – though "bargaining points" might be a better term – for economists, and ten for noneconomists. The latter includes "If you think all economists think alike, attend one of their seminars" and "If you think economists are especially rude to noneconomists, attend one of their seminars" (as if rudeness were a sign of healthy debate). However there is no such exhortation for economists to

attend seminars outside their own field; and indeed the book makes little attempt to find out what these complaints from students, heterodox economists, and other non-card carriers actually are.

For example, one of the major criticisms of economic models is that they rarely account for the effects of money, banks, credit, or the financial sector. This omission, which played a hugely important role in the crisis, is beyond curious, it is downright bizarre; but as with other such books to gurggle out of the mainstream there is hardly any mention of money, apart from the observation that phenomena such as bubbles and bank runs have been known about for a long time. Nor does the book come to grips with the interesting questions of why theories of non-conformists such as Minsky were sidelined, or why the field's core teachings of efficiency, rationality, etc. came to be so perfectly aligned with the PR needs of the financial sector.

Economics Rules offers many useful and valid insights into the nature of economic models, but attempts to rationalise away the problems which confront the field rather than face them squarely. So here is not a commandment, but a gentle suggestion to economists in this difficult time: let's try to get stage 4 (depression) over with quickly, it's time for stage 5: acceptance.

Stay tuned.

On economics, funerals and digital Taylorism By [Stuart Birks](#)

Max Plank famously said "Science advances one funeral at a time." His use of the word "advances" suggests forward progress, rather than just change. Power struggles for dominance of ideas do have a generational dimension, but the path of history is not monotonically upward. In fact, there are some very worrying signs in the experience of economics in recent decades.

Fifty years ago the second edition of Lipsey's famous text was published. Some thought that *An Introduction to Positive Economics* gave too narrow a representation of society, but there was still a heavy emphasis on the nature of analysis. In his introduction Lipsey wrote:

"There are three major themes to this text-book which should be mentioned here: first, an attempt to explain what economic theory is about and how one can go about criticising it effectively and hence improving it; second, an attempt to elaborate, in so far as is possible within the confines of an introduction to economic theory, the relation between theory and real-world observations; and third, a consideration of the relation between economic theory and economic policy." (P.xiii)

On p.8, in footnote 1, he also wrote: "It is often thought that scientific procedure consists of grinding out

answers with reference to blind rules of calculation and that it is only in the arts that the exercise of real imagination is required. This view is misguided..."

Students at that time saw clearly the distinction between theory and the real world, recognising that theory may be a useful tool, but requiring care and imagination in its application.

Many of those who now call themselves heterodox economists are the product of such an education. For much of their working lives they identified simply as economists, but the term no longer reflects their modes of thought. It has become necessary to distinguish between economics as broadly based enquiry drawing on a wide range of tools and perspectives and the current dominant representation of economics. Many see the latter as seriously limited, it being based on unrealistic postulates and using a narrow range of questionable research techniques while making inflated claims about its power to explain the real world.

Change may come in the near future through retirements and funerals, but it will be the retirements and funerals of those who came from the broader tradition and had the means to challenge the mainstream.

Hugh Lauder and Phillip Brown have publicised the term “Digital Taylorism”. Stated briefly they describe this as, “translating knowledge work into working knowledge through the extraction, codification and digitalization of knowledge into software prescripts that can be transmitted and manipulated by others regardless of location.” [See here](#). This is a serious obstacle to anyone who would attempt to bring more thought and imagination into economic analysis. While they are referring to a widespread phenomenon, we can see its relevance for economics. Large numbers of students are trained in a relatively mechanical approach to economics, with research being heavily focused on routine techniques as in econometrics packages. This has become the new norm and has set the criteria for appointments and career progression.

Assisting in this trend is the move to the new managerialism. Johnson and Bröms (2000) write critically of the MBA culture where detached managers run organisa-

tions based on abstract models and quantitative reporting methods. In *Catch-22* Heller satirises this approach in a military context:

“Without realizing how it had come about, the combat men in the squadron discovered themselves dominated by the administrators appointed to serve them. They were bullied, insulted, harassed and shoved about all day long by one after the other.” (Heller, 1996, p.113)

Desirable change in economics cannot be expected as a natural progression over time. It is in this difficult environment that the current generation of student protestors will have to find a strategy whereby a more realistic economics can arise.

Heller, J. (1996). *Catch-22*: New York: Simon & Schuster
Johnson, H. T., & Bröms, A. (2000). *Profit beyond measure: extraordinary results through attention to work and people*. New York: Free Press.

Special Announcement: Revision of World Economic Review Statement of Purpose

Effective immediately, the World Economic Review (now the **World Economic Review: Contemporary Policy Issues**) is narrowing its focus so as to give it a more clearly defined identity and to provide an outlet for work that is otherwise largely ignored by economics journals. In particular, we will now publish analyses of current and emerging policy issues throughout the globe.

Our first issue will be “Europe in Crisis” and will be organized around the following theme:

When the Treaty of Rome was signed creating the European Economic Community, one of the hopes was that this would create a level of integration and interdependence that would end the centuries of violence that had plagued the continent. Starting with six nations in 1958, it survived the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and post-Yugoslavia Balkan conflicts to grow to twenty-eight, nineteen of whom share the same currency. Just a few years ago, there was speculation that the euro might replace the dollar as the world reserve currency.

And yet today, serious cracks are emerging. The periphery countries are straining to meet financial obligations, unemployment is reaching record levels, and ethnic tensions are rising – all factors more characteristic of Weimar Germany than a healthy and harmonious Europe. We therefore wait with baited breath to see whether this proves to be a bump in the road or a return to the destructive normalcy that prevailed before former enemies banded together to create what they hoped would be a foundation for future peace and prosperity.

This issue of the World Economic Review is devoted to discovering what policies contributed to these stark developments, which ones have lent stability, and where should we go from here.

Expected publication is Winter 2016.

Submissions on this and other policy issues are welcome, as are suggestions for future themed issues. Please send to: weditor@worldeconomicsassociation.org

WER web page and latest issue (Feb 2016, Europe in Crisis): <http://wer.worldeconomicsassociation.org/>

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